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ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN THE WORKPLACE:
WHY ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION BENEFITS EMPLOYERS
Stephen A. Brown'
Illegal immigrants pose a serious financial risk for employers.
Present federal law requires employers to make a "reasonable"
determination regarding the validity of prospective employees'
documentation without overreaching and subjecting the employee
to hiring discrimination. Failure to correctly make the
determination or overreaching when doing so could result in
criminal and civil penalties for the employer. The policy's
inherent difficulties have permitted some industries to become
dependent on comparatively cheaper, illegal labor. Private
enforcement actions and electronic verification are two proposed
methods to help solve the problem. This Comment will compare
these two methods and argue that electronic verification provides
a more comprehensive and beneficial solution for employers while
private enforcement perpetuates many negative aspects of current
policy.
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008. Special
thanks to my wife, Christa, for her patience and support in this endeavor.
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"We'll enforce our immigration laws at the worksite and give
employers the tools to verify the legal status of their workers, so
there's no excuse left for violating the law. "2
-President George W. Bush
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2006, federal immigration authorities raided
six plants owned by Swift & Company ("Swift"), a Colorado based
meatpacking company that produces $9 billion in annual sales.'
The raids were part of an effort to crack-down on the hiring of
illegal immigrants.' In what would become the largest worksite
enforcement operation in U.S. history, officials apprehended 1,282
illegal workers.'
2 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007).
3 SWIFT & Co., U.S. IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS COMMENCE EMPLOYEE
INTERVIEWS AT SIX SWIFT & Co. FACILITIES (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.
swiftbrands.com/media/releases/2006_12 12_SwiftICE Interviews.PDF
[hereinafter INTERVIEWS] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); Michael Heygood, Angel Reyes & Barry Pound, Former
Employees File RICO Lawsuit Against Swift & Co., PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 18,
2006, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/
www/story/12-18-2006/0004493287&EDATE= [hereinafter RICO Lawsuit] (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Associated Press,
Ex-Employees Sue MeatPacking Company Targeted in Illegal Immigration Raid
for Wage Manipulation, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,237269,00.html?sPage=fnc.specialsections/immigration
[hereinafter Ex-Employees] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
4 See, e.g., INTERVIEWS, supra note 3.
5 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Uncovers Large-Scale
Identity Theft Scheme Used by Illegal Aliens to Gain Employment at
Nationwide Meat Processor (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
newsreleases/articles/061213dc.htm [hereinafter Identity Scheme] (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); JULIE MYERS, ASSISTANT
SEC'Y, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REMARKS AT A NEWS CONFERENCE
ANNOUNCING A WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION AT A NATIONWIDE MEAT
PROCESSOR (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/testimonies/
061213wseo.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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As a result of the raid, Swift lost nearly ten percent of its
workforce.' Moreover, eighteen of Swift's former employees filed
a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas alleging Swift conspired to lower employee wages by hiring
illegal aliens in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act7 ("RICO").' RICO is a federal law that permits
private enforcement of immigration laws when a company
participates in a "pattern of racketeering activity."' The
consequences for Swift are severe. If the plaintiffs' claims are
successful, the company faces $23 million in liability, not counting
turnover costs and loss of productivity from the raids."o
Since 1997, Swift has voluntarily used an electronic
verification program known as Basic Pilot." Basic Pilot is an
Internet-based system that attempts to prevent employers from
hiring illegal aliens by verifying prospective employee
documentation using government databases.12 Once enrolled in the
program, employers are required to verify the work authorization
of all new hires within three days of employment."
6 Swift Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at A28. Other estimates say that
Swift could lose up to forty percent of its workforce as a result of the raids.
Associated Press, Over 1,200 Arrested in 6 States in Illegal Immigrant Identity
Theft Sting, FoxNEWS.CoM, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,236204,00.html?sPage=fnc.specialsections/immigration [hereinafter
Sting] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
7 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (2006).
8 RICO Lawsuit, supra note 3.
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
o0 Swift Says Lawsuit Is "Without Merit," MEATNEWS.cOM, Dec. 20, 2006,
http://www.meatnews.com/index.cfn?fuseaction=article&artNum=13368 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
1 INTERVIEWS, supra note 3.
12 See Smart Business Practices, Making the Basic Pilot Work for Your
Business, http://www.smartbusinesspractices.com/legal-basicpilot.php
[hereinafter Your Business] (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'3 JESSICA VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, VERIFICATION OF
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION: FEDERAL BASIC PILOT PROGRAM IS AN
EFFECTIVE EMPLOYER-FRIENDLY TOOL FOR IMMIGRATION LAW COMPLIANCE
(Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/jrmvtestimony022106.html (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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Employers take the work-authorization information provided
by the employee and transmit it via the internet to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which processes the information to
the Social Security Administration (SSA).14 After SSA
electronically compares the information to its records, employers
receive a message from DHS either authorizing the employee for
work or, should DHS not be able to verify the employee's work
authorization after a manual review, instructing the employer to
send the employee to SSA to resolve the problem." If a
non-confirmation notice remains uncontested by the employee
after ten days, employers receive a final non-confirmation notice
and have the option to either terminate the employee or notify
DHS that the employee is being retained.'" If employers choose to
retain the employee, the employer could be liable for criminal and
civil immigration violations."
Clearly, however, the program failed to prevent Swift from
employing illegal aliens. According to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), the federal authorities responsible for the
Swift raid, illegal immigrants were able to "thwart" the Basic Pilot
system using stolen social security numbers and other
documentation of U.S. citizens." Basic Pilot was equipped to
expose an applicant's use of false information, but not fraudulent
information stolen from unsuspecting Americans.19 Michael
Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
explained that Basic Pilot "is not a magic bullet . . .. [W]hile Basic
Pilot inoculates a company against one kind of illegal immigration
fraud, it doesn't inoculate against all kinds of fraud."20
Despite this limitation, the State of North Carolina recently
mandated that all state agencies, offices, and universities begin
14 id
15 Id.
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) & (f) (2006); VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
18 Identity Scheme, supra note 5.
19 Michael Chertoff, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks at a Press
Conference on Operation Wagon Train (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/pr_1 166047951514.shtm.20 id
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using Basic Pilot to ensure that every employee is "legally eligible
to work."2' Becoming one of only a handful of states to implement
the system, North Carolina requires that all new state hires, ranging
between 1,500 and 2,000 per month, be run through the system.22
In addition, the state's 2,189 public schools and 99 charter
schools 23 were required to implement the system by March 1,
2007.24 In light of the raid on Swift, it may seem that North
Carolina is wrong to expend valuable state resources on a
seemingly ineffective system. The Swift raid, however, does not
merely highlight Basic Pilot's limitations. On the contrary, Swift's
experience also illustrates the system's advantages.
This Comment compares the Basic Pilot Program to private
enforcement actions and evaluates its ability to mitigate risk for
employers and its broader effect on illegal immigration. In doing
so, Basic Pilot will be contrasted with private enforcement actions
like that utilized against Swift. The comparison will reveal the
many disadvantages of private enforcement and Basic Pilot's
ability to better provide law-abiding businesses with a level
economic playing field and protection against costly immigration
violations.
Part II provides an overview of the current debate over
employer dependency on illegal labor and outlines a series of
economic and political problems perpetuated by the large number
of illegal immigrants in the workforce. Part III analyzes current
federal regulations and describes the tremendous burden placed on
employers when attempting to verify employee work authorization.
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-7.1(f) (2006); Veronica Gonzalez, A Tool to Check
New Hires, STAR NEWS, Jan. 13, 2007, at Al; see also Jean P. Fisher, UNC
Hospitals Workers Illegal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 30, 2007, at B3 (noting that
the state auditor acknowledges access to the federal database system has been
for less than one year and implying that the program should assist UNC Hospital
in complying with state worker verification requirements).
22 Gonzalez, supra note 21.
23 Id.; N.C. State Bd. of Educ., Quick Facts, http://www.ncpublicschools.org/
quickfacts/facts/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
24 Sloane Heffernan, Getting Any State Job Now Means Online Immigration
Check, WRAL.CoM, Jan. 25, 2007, http://wral.com/news/local/story/1179603/
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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Part III further posits that selective enforcement by immigration
authorities exacerbates these problems. Part IV examines various
forms of private enforcement actions-one proposed method for
restraining employers from hiring illegal aliens-and suggests that
private enforcement actions perpetuate the status quo by enhancing
the burden on employers and continuing selective enforcement of
the law. Finally, Part V contrasts Basic Pilot with private
enforcement and current federal regulations to demonstrate that
electronic verification performs three functions: (1) it reduces
employer responsibility for immigration enforcement; (2) it
enhances the ability of federal authorities to prosecute
unscrupulous employers and provide across-the-board enforcement
of immigration laws; and (3) it provides an additional tool to detect
counterfeit documents offered by prospective employees.
II. A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP: ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS AND
THE LABOR MARKET
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates between 11.5 and
12 million illegal immigrants live in the United States. 25  The
resulting costs to taxpayers26 and questions involving border
25 JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2-5 (Mar. 7, 2006),
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. The Pew Hispanic Center estimated:
[T]he U.S. is home to between 11.5 million and 12 million illegal
immigrants, up sharply from 8.4 million in 2000. Unauthorized
migrants accounted for 30% of all foreign-born people in the U.S. as of
2005. Most unauthorized migrants-6.2 million, or 56% of the illegal
population-come from Mexico. About 2.5 million, or 22% of the
total, come from the rest of Latin America.
Immigration Debate: Its Impact on Workers, Wages and Employers,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, May 17, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=1482&CFID=3470644&CFTOK [hereinafter Immigration
Debate] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In
North Carolina, it is estimated that there are approximately 400,000 illegal
immigrants. Karin Rives, Illegal Immigration-Jobs, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb.
26, 2006, at Al.
26 VAUGHAN, supra note 13. The Center for Immigration Studies estimates
that, "in 2002, the cost to the federal government was roughly $10 billion, even
after accounting for taxes paid by illegal aliens. These costs are primarily for
354 [VOL. 8: 349
SPRING 2007] Immigrants & Electronic Verification
security 27 raise many political concerns. However, illegal
immigrants have had perhaps their most significant impact on the
labor market. There are six to seven million illegal immigrants
working in the United States, comprising approximately five
percent of the nation's total workforce.2 8 Whether illegal workers
have had a positive or negative effect on the labor market has long
been the subject of a heated debate. On the one side, employers
claim that the influx of illegal labor is vital to the survival of their
businesses. On the other, workers' rights advocates argue that
illegal immigrants depress their wages and working conditions. As
the following analysis reveals, they both may be right.
Many employers, particularly those in industries involving
heavy labor and dangerous or unsavory working conditions, argue
Medicaid, health care for the uninsured, food assistance programs, the federal
prison and court systems, and education funding." Id.
27 See Jeffrey L. Ehrenpreis, Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced
Employer Sanctions, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (2006). "[A]n al Qaida
website noted in 2002 [that] only 5 percent of the flood of people and goods that
cross the Mexican border each year are inspected." Id. (citing Heather
MacDonald, Homeland Security? Not Yet (2004), http://www.city-joumal.org/
html/14_4 homeland.html). "Last year, Department of Homeland Security
('DHS') officials told a congressional committee that al Qaeda operatives are
seeking access to the United States through Mexico." Id. (citing Chad Groening
& Jenni Parker, Bonner, Bauer Say Bush Budget Gives Border Patrol Short-
shrift, Conservatives Bewildered that White House Fails to See Homeland
Security Implications, AGAPEPRESS, Mar. 7, 2005, http://headlines.agapepress.
org/archive/3/72005e.asp). "Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has voiced
similar concerns about the risk the Mexican border poses to national security."
Id. (citing Genaro C. Armas, Undocumented Population Surges 23%, Report
Says, DESERT MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Mar. 22, 2005).
And according to Gary Bauer, spokesperson for the group American
Values[:] "[I]n 2003, about 5 percent of captured illegal immigrants
crossing the [Mexican] border were OTMs or 'Other than Mexicans.'
Given all of these warnings about potential terrorists coming across the
Mexican border, the United States must take control of its illegal
immigration problem."
Id. (citing Chad Groening & Jenni Parker, Bonner, Bauer Say Bush Budget
Gives Border Patrol Short-shrift, Conservatives Bewildered that White House
Fails to See Homeland Security Implications, AGAPEPRESS, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/3/72005e.asp).
28 Immigration Debate, supra note 25; Eduardo Porter, The Search for Illegal
Immigrants Stops at the Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at C3.
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that American citizens are simply unwilling to work under the
conditions these jobs require.29 The number of illegal aliens
employed by these industries suggests that employers are correct.
Illegal immigrants comprise "fourteen percent of all construction
workers, seventeen percent of all cleaning workers, twelve percent
of all food preparation workers, and twenty-four percent of all
farm workers."" Employers insist the loss of these employees
would threaten the viability of their businesses. For example,
several North Carolina employers recently stated that illegal
immigrants were "meeting [their] critical need" for labor."
Moreover, attorneys for Swift sought to enjoin immigration
officials from conducting raids on its facilities by arguing the
company would lose forty percent of its workforce due to the
government crack down.32 Members of Congress have even stated
that there is a dependency on illegal labor in these industries."
Therefore, many employers would be hurt by the sudden loss of
illegal labor.
This evidence, however, supplies only a partial picture of the
self-perpetuating character of employer dependency on illegal
labor. Peter Cappelli, Director of the Center for Human Resources
at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, proposes
a different theory for this dependency:
Immigrants have been hired to do [low-skilled] jobs in such large
numbers, not because Americans refuse them, but because Americans
are not willing to perform such tasks where wages are lower than they
would otherwise be, where work rules may not exist and where the
working conditions may be hazardous.34
29 See Spencer Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized,
WASH. POST, June 19, 2006, at Al.30 Immigration Debate, supra note 25.
31 Rives, supra note 25.
32 Sting, supra note 6. Swift ultimately lost the argument and federal officials
arrested 1,200 illegal immigrants which worked for Swift. Id.
3 Shailagh Murray, Conservatives Split in Debate on Curbing Illegal
Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at A2, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64179-2005Mar24.html.
34 Immigration Debate, supra note 25; see also Stephanie Tangor, Enforcing
Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workplace Immigration Laws: The
Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 59, 64 (2006) (stating
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Thus, as more and more employers took advantage of illegal labor
to lower their costs, the necessity to stay competitive in the
marketplace evolved into industry-wide dependency."
Professor Cappelli is not alone in this assessment. As early as
1988, Congress was aware employers were hiring cheaper and
more vulnerable illegal workers, and that the practice was
depressing wages and displacing workers." In a recent poll
conducted by the Center for Immigration Studies, a majority of the
public agreed that Americans would perform these low-skilled jobs
if employers were to pay higher wages." Additionally, the suit
brought by former Swift employees against the company is based
on this theory.38 Regardless of the cause of their dependency,
however, employers argue the threat to their businesses is
nonetheless real.
Political pressure exerted by employers that utilize illegal labor
has forced immigration officials to stop otherwise effective
enforcement operations. In 1998, immigration officials raided the
"Americans will do the jobs, but they will demand reasonable wages and up-to-
par workplace conditions"). Professor Cappelli also argues that the problem is
not caused by legal low-skilled labor because "legal immigrants are let in, at
least in part, on economic judgments about where the needs are for their skills
.... That's one of the criteria for being allowed to come in." Immigration
Debate, supra note 25.
3 See Immigration Debate, supra note 25.
36 U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: INFLUENCE OF
ILLEGAL WORKERS ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF LEGAL WORKERS
1 (1988), http://archive.gao.gov/d34tll/135244.pdf. When Congress asked the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Do illegal alien workers displace
(that is, take jobs away from) native or illegal workers?," the GAO answered
with a "highly qualified 'yes."' Id. Congress also asked, "Do illegal alien
workers depress wages and worsen working conditions for native and legal
workers?," and again the GAO answered with a "qualified 'yes."' Id.
3 CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE PUBLIC'S VIEW OF IMMIGRATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 2 (2006), http://www.cis.org/articles/
2006/back906.html [hereinafter PUBLIC'S VIEW]. In addition, it has been argued
that a decrease in disposable income negatively effects Americans' disposition
toward illegal immigration which provides empirical evidence that wage
suppression has an impact on the American public's attitude toward illegal
immigrants. See JOEL FETZER, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 83 (2000).
38 See Ex-Employees, supra note 3.
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Georgia onion industry in an effort to catch illegal workers.39
Despite the relative success of the operation in identifying illegal
workers, farmers complained to their representatives in
Washington, D.C. that the operation left them with insufficient
labor to gather their $90 million harvest.4 0 The operation was
halted due to political pressure from Georgia Senator Paul
Coverdell and Representative Jack Kingston.41
In 1999, immigration officials launched another enforcement
operation to curb illegal labor, known as Operation Vanguard, this
time targeting meat-packing facilities in Nebraska, Iowa, and
South Dakota. Operation Vanguard was relatively successful,
discovering that nearly 5,000 out of 24,000 workers had
questionable documentation.42 As was the case in Georgia,
political pressure caused by plant closings forced immigration
officials to halt operations. 43  Not only do these operations
demonstrate employers' dependency on illegal immigration, they
also reveal the political inhibitor for reform and the reason for such
low enforcement numbers by immigration authorities.44
3 Hsu & Lydersen, supra note 29; Porter, supra note 28.
40 Hsu & Lydersen, supra note 29.
41 id.
42 Francesca Jarosz, What's An Employer To Do? People Want to Work:
Help Them or Turn Them in?, 16 Bus. L. TODAY 49, 51 (2006).
43 id.
4 See Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, A Tale of Competing Policies: The Creation of
Havens for Illegal Immigrants and the Black Market Economy in the European
Union, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 431, 434 (2004) ("The employment of illegal
immigrants brings to light the politics of immigration policies in a destination
country. That is, while employers of illegal immigrants lobby for lax
enforcement of immigration control in order to reap the benefits of a cheap
source of labor, groups that are responsible for the existence of immigration
laws in the first place-such as citizens and unions-lobby for tighter control of
immigration laws. The result is a political compromise that leads to the
presence of a black market. That is, politicians are forced to speak through both
sides of their mouths. They appease the citizenry's fears of an immigrant
invasion through external manifestations of immigration regulation such as
border control. But, they also protect the needs of employers through means
that do not jeopardize the image of a strong hand against illegal immigration,
namely the lax enforcement of immigration laws in the labor market.").
358 [VOL. 8: 349
SPRING 2007] Immigrants & Electronic Verification
Assuming that employers are dependent on illegal immigrants
and that illegal workers have a propensity to displace American
workers, illegal labor is a race to the bottom. When employers hire
illegal labor, costs for employers go down, which causes profits to
go up.4 5 As a result, competitors of the original employer must
respond by lowering their costs to stay competitive in the market.4 6
In order to lower costs, competitors resort to hiring illegal labor,
further entrenching the dependence on illegal immigrants. As the
cycle continues, other employers are faced with the option of either
hiring the cheaper labor or going out business.47
As a result, enforcement efforts by immigration authorities
seem doomed to failure. If an enforcement program becomes too
successful, lobbying pressure from industries that have become
accustomed to illegal labor intensifies. In turn, the area's
Congressional representatives seek to stop the operation on the
grounds that selective enforcement would leave targeted employers
unable to compete. In the meantime, the number of illegal
immigrants entering the country continues to grow because of the
increased demand for their low-cost labor, and dependent
employers continue to receive an ample supply of illegal labor.
Part III will explore current federal regulation governing the
hiring of illegal immigrants. In doing so, the conclusions
postulated will cast light on the issues necessary for a
comprehensive solution which accounts for the concerns of
industries dependent on illegal labor and the need to stop the
growing population of illegal immigrants.
45 See Immigration Debate, supra note 25.
46 See Adam J. Homicz, Private Enforcement ofImmigration Law: Expanded
Definitions Under RICO and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 38 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 621, 621 (2005) ("Generally, companies employing illegal aliens can
minimize operating costs and underbid competitors that hire only legally
documented workers. Higher labor costs handicap employers who play by the
rules.").
47 Hsu & Lydersen, supra note 29 ("It would be hard to sustain political
support for vigorous work-site enforcement if you don't give employers an
avenue to hire their workers in a way that is legal, because you're basically
saying, 'You've got to go out of business."').
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III. IRCA OF 1986: MISSING THE MARK AND HITTING
EMPLOYERS
Federal regulation prohibiting the hiring of illegal immigrants
has existed for over twenty years. Passed in 1986, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act48 ("IRCA") contained four highly
controversial provisions that were the result of compromise
between those who believed employer sanctions would stop illegal
immigration and those who believed employer sanctions would
lead to discrimination against "foreign-looking people."49 IRCA
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act 0 ("INA") to provide
limited amnesty to certain qualified illegal aliens, set forth
penalties for employers who hired illegal aliens, instituted a
program to ensure employer compliance, and enacted
anti-discrimination provisions to punish employers who
discriminate against an applicant on the basis of nationality or
citizenship." Furthermore, IRCA gave nearly three million illegal
immigrants residency status.5 2 Perhaps more importantly, by
charging employers with the responsibility of verifying worker
documentation under threat of civil or even criminal penalties,
IRCA placed the future of immigration enforcement in the hands
of the nation's employers." Part III examines IRCA's
requirements for employers and outlines several problems that
work to undermine its effectiveness.
48 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
49 DAVID S. NORTH, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION REFORM
ITS FIRST YEAR (Nov. 1987), http://www.cis.org/articles/1987/paper4.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
'o 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
51 See id. § 1324a-1324c.
52 DAVID SIMCox, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, MEASURING THE
FALLOUT: THE COST OF THE IRCA AMNESTY AFTER 10 YEARS (1997),
available at http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/backl97.htm; see also Kitty
Calavita, U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legislation,
CONTROLLING IMMIGR. A GLOBAL PERSP. 68 (1994).
" 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-1324c.
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A. Employer Responsibilities
IRCA instituted substantial requirements on employers in an
effort to terminate the flow of illegal immigration into the United
States. These requirements include prohibitions on hiring illegal
aliens, compliance provisions to enable oversight by immigration
authorities, and provisions to prevent employers from
discriminating against legal immigrants.54 A brief overview of
these provisions exposes the inherent complexities of the rules and
explains why employers have difficulties in attempting to comply.
The first provision is the heart of the Act. Section 1324a
prohibits employers from hiring an employee "knowing the
[employee] is an unauthorized alien."" This rule extends to
individual "persons," such as a single-parent hiring a nanny, and
"entities" like corporations or partnerships." The rule also applies
to the hiring of independent contractors who employ illegal
immigrants." The broad scope of the statute is illustrated in a
recent enforcement action against mega-retailer Wal-Mart. DHS's
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division ("ICE"), the
agency responsible for immigration enforcement, alleged that Wal-
Mart hired an independent contractor to clean its stores even
though Wal-Mart knew the company employed illegal aliens."
Following a lengthy investigation, Wal-Mart agreed to pay
$11 million to settle the case."
In order to ensure employer compliance and allow certain
employers to avoid a presumption that they "knowingly" hired
54 Id.
" Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2006); Breaking News: Linda Chavez Withdraws
as Labor Secretary Nominee (CNN television broadcast Jan. 9, 2001) (transcript
on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0101/09/bn.02.html (detailing how
Linda Chavez, a 2001 nominee for Secretary of Labor by President Bush, was
forced to withdraw her nomination when it came to light that she allegedly hired
an illegal immigrant as a nanny).
" 8 U.S.C § 1324a(a)(4).
58 John Pearce II, The Dangerous Intersection ofIndependent Contractor Law
and the Immigration Reform and Control Act: The Impact of the Wal-Mart
Settlement, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 597, 599-601 (2006).
59 Id. at 600.
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illegal aliens, employers must participate in an "employment
verification system.""o Under this system, an employer must verify
a potential employee is not an unauthorized alien by examining
government-approved documents to establish both the employee's
identity as well as their authorization for employment.6 ' The list of
acceptable documents ranges from resident alien cards and
passports to driver's licenses and social security cards.62
Employers are expected to verify that the documentation
"reasonably appear[s]" genuine under penalty of perjury.
Employers must retain the verification form in case the
government decides to inspect it later.' Failure to comply with
these provisions could prove costly for employers. In addition to
criminal sanctions, civil penalties could reach $5,000 for each
violation of the hiring prohibitions." Violations of the compliance
provisions could result in fines of $1,000 per violation.6
As a method to both protect the employer and provide
incentive for compliance, IRCA provides that any employer who
complies with the aforementioned system receives the benefit of a
"good faith" defense in the event questions later arise regarding the
employee's eligibility for employment.6 ' However, compliance is
not an absolute defense. Courts have held that an employer's good
faith compliance is subject to a "reasonable man" standard,
meaning that, at a minimum, an employer's verification decision
may be subject to review.68 Moreover, employers may be held to a
60 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(6)(C)(i).
61 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)-(D) (2006).
63Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 1324a(b)(3); John D. Copeland, Hiring Illegal Workers is Risky
Business, NAT'L HOG FARMER, Nov. 1, 1997, http://nationalhogfanner.com/
mag/farminghiringillegal workers/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
65 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (criminal sanctions); 8 U.S.C § 1324a(e)(4) (penalties
for violations of hiring prohibitions).
66 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
68 Collins Food Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
statute shows that Congress did not intend the [IRCA] to cause employers to
become experts in identifying and examining a prospective employee's
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"constructive knowledge" standard, which has special significance
in the hiring of independent contractors.69 John Pearce, professor
at the Villanova University School of Business, explains: "[A]n
employer could be held liable for the hiring practices of an
independent contractor if it has adequate notice that the contractor
is employing illegal aliens," even if the contractor was the one to
review the employee's documentation.70
In addition to these requirements, IRCA demands that
employers not over-reach when seeking to verify prospective
employee documentation. Section 1324b prohibits "discrimination
based on national origin or citizenship status."" While there are
exceptions depending on the size of the business,7 2 employers who
fail to honor documents that appear reasonable on their face could
be subject to allegations of discrimination" and penalties reaching
$1,000 per incident.74
Although simplistic on its face, in practice IRCA requirements
place a heavy burden on employers who are responsible for
verifying and retaining a plethora of acceptable documentation.
Non-compliance could result not only in hefty fines for an
employer, but also additional turnover costs and lost productivity.
employment authorization documents . . . . [T]he 'reasonable man standard' is to
be used in implementing this provision.").
69 Pearce, supra note 58, at 605.70 id
n 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (2006).
721d. § 1324b(a)(2).
7 Id. § 1324b(a)(1) and (6).
74 Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(IV).
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B. The Problematic Aftermath
With the implementation of IRCA, employers found
themselves on the front line of the battle against illegal
immigration. In the early years following IRCA's implementation,
its apparent weaknesses" enabled the number of illegal immigrants
entering the country to soar to approximately 500,000 every year. 6
As the number of illegal immigrants increased, so did employers'
dependency on them as a source of cheap labor."
The irony of the situation is that the intended consequence of
IRCA's provisions (a moratorium on the hiring of illegal
immigrants) was undermined by the very means used to effectuate
it. Aptly referred to as the "deputization" of American employers,
IRCA's primary flaw was the tremendous burden the compliance
provisions placed on employers." With little government
oversight, employers are expected to work to identify and exclude
illegal immigrants while simultaneously exercising sufficient
restraint to avoid discriminating against prospective employees.
The first challenge faced by employers that led to the failure of
IRCA was the practical problem of identifying fraudulent
7 See Jennifer Danburg, Strengthening Employer Sanctions Through Worker
Identification Cards and a National Data Base: Effective Barriers to Illegal
Immigration? 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 525, 530 (1995) ("Serious questions have
been raised about the effectiveness of the employer sanctions provisions as they
currently exist. The two key problems identified by the government are the
availability of counterfeit documents and confusion as to which documents are
allowed under IRCA. The GAO also indicated in testimony that the twenty-nine
acceptable documents for the 1-9 form are a contributing factor to the
confusion."); see also Cecilia Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 370
(1994).
76 Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Current Numbers, http://www.cis.org/topics/
currentnumbers.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); Federation for American Immigration Reform,
Illegal Resident Aliens, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
researchresearch9605#illegal (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
n See supra Part II(A).
78 Thomas C. Green & Ilcana Ciobanu, Article: Deputizing-And Then
Prosecuting-America's Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1203, 1205-08 (2006).
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documentation." The list of acceptable documentation includes
approximately twenty-nine forms of identification, some of which
are issued by the varying standards of state and local
governments."o For multi-state corporations, training staff to
successfully identify fraudulent documents from among a wide
variety of possibilities has proven difficult and time-consuming,
and the results have been less than ideal. Moreover, the counterfeit
document industry has become increasingly sophisticated, which
makes fake documentation even more difficult to spot.
With an estimated eleven million illegal immigrants needing
documents for employment, the counterfeit industry is thriving."
Fifty dollars can buy an illegal immigrant sufficient documentation
to gain employment.82 In 2005, a study conducted by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the high
level of "document and identity fraud made it difficult for
employers who wanted to comply with the employment
verification process."" In a separate report that same year, the
GAO remarked to Congress that the "[n]umber and variety of
acceptable documents hinders the verification process."84
The ease with which such documents are counterfeited also
allows employers who "knowingly" hire illegal immigrants to
7 Danburg, supra note 75, at 530.
80 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
FORM 1-9, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf [hereinafter FORM 1-9] (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
8 Green & Ciobanu, supra note 78, at 1206.
82 Porter, supra note 28.
83 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE
ENFORCEMENT 6 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
84 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 8 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05822t.pdf
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS] (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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claim plausible deniability." Thus, the massive counterfeit
industry renders IRCA ineffective by simultaneously preventing
scrupulous employers from effectively detecting illegal immigrants
and providing more security to employers who choose to violate
the law by hiring illegal labor. But problems for employers do not
end there.
Employers who identify what they perceive to be fraudulent
documentation are faced with a second problem: choosing
whether to hire the alleged alien and face potential sanctions by
immigration officials, or to request additional documentation from
the applicant and face a possible discrimination suit.86 IRCA's
requirement of a good-faith documentation determination coupled
with its prohibition against hiring discrimination has forced
employers to choose between equally risky propositions." For
example, a farmer in Florida was found liable for discriminating
against six of his employees after he questioned their
documentation and fired them when they could not produce any
additional documents." One year earlier, the very same farmer had
been fined $100,000 by immigration officials for violating IRCA's
prohibitions against hiring illegal immigrants.89 Court decisions
have not been very useful in helping employers manage their risks
either. The grey line of the "reasonable man" standard employed
by courts when reviewing employers' verification of
documentation is of little guidance or comfort to an employer
85 EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 83; Porter, supra note 28; see
David A. Martin, The Obstacles to Effective Internal Enforcement of the
Immigration Laws in the United States, in 4 IMMIGRATION CONTROLS, THE
SEARCH FOR WORKABLE POLICIES IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 8-9
(Kay Hailbronner, David A. Martin & Hiroshi Motomura eds., 1998).
86 Natalie Prescott, Immigration Reforms Fuels Employment Discrimination,
55 DRAKE L. REv. 1 (2006); Richard Sobel, Article: The Degradation of
Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 37, 57-58 (2002); Jarosz, supra note 42, at 52.
87 Prescott, supra note 86, at 1-3; Jarosz, supra note 42, at 52; see Sobel,
supra note 86, at 57-58.
88 Prescott, supra note 86, at 1-2 (citing United States v. Strano Farms,
5 OCAHO 748, at 211 (1995)).
89 ld
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faced with a need for labor and a suspicious looking social security
card."o
To add insult to injury, immigration officials have not been
able to effectively enforce employer sanctions. In the early years
following the passage of IRCA, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service staffed only 350 people to oversee
compliance and enforcement of the entire Act.9' The fact that the
Act does not require employers to proactively send their document
verification information to immigration officials compounded the
staffing problem.9 2 Consequently, immigration officials never
actually review the employer's decision unless they request the
information directly from the employer, or when someone tips
them off to the alleged misconduct." Thus, the current
methodology not only provides dishonest employers with an
additional layer of comfort when hiring illegal aliens, but, because
of the nature of selective enforcement, employers who either
choose to comply with the law or are forced to do so by
90 See Pearce supra note 58, at 604.
9' Jeffrey Sharp, NAFTA Will Increase U.S. Jobs, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 155,
158 (1994).
92 FORM 1-9, supra note 80. The 1-9 Form, which is the form issued by the
federal government on which employers are to record the employee's
information, asks employers: "PLEASE DO NOT MAIL COMPLETED FORM
TO THE ICE OR USCIS." Id.
93 See Espenoza, supra note 75, at 377-8 1.
[For a time,] the INS negotiated with the Department of Labor
Employment Standards Administration (ESA) to assist in 1-9 review.
The two agencies filed a memorandum of understanding that delineates
shared enforcement responsibilities of IRCA. Pursuant to the
agreement, the DOL assists the INS with IRCA enforcement by
collecting information on employer compliance in conjunction with its
routine labor investigations. The initial stages of this joint venture
were fairly unproductive because the DOL did not include the
three-day 1-9 inspection notice as required by the statute and as a result
they could not conduct 1-9 inspections. Despite corrections in the DOL
notification process, four percent of their routine inspections still fail to
include an 1-9 compliance review. Even with this partnership, the INS
and DOL only reach less than one percent of the nation's estimated
seven million employers annually. This level of enforcement severely
limits the deterrent effect contemplated with the adoption of sanctions.
Id. at 378.
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immigration officials must then compete on an unfair playing field
with employers who have not been targeted.
In recent years, SSA has attempted to assist immigration
officials by sending "no-match" letters to employers who submit
W-2 forms when employee social security numbers do not match
its records.94 While this did increase the rate of identification
somewhat, interest groups representing the dependent industries
have lobbied to halt the practice.9 5
Despite its goal of preventing the hiring of illegal immigrants,
IRCA clearly fostered employer dependency on illegal labor. By
"deputizing" employers who had little or no training in counterfeit
document detection and providing virtually no oversight by
immigration authorities, the Act embodied the seeds of its own
failure. The Basic Pilot Program and private enforcement actions
were both passed in an effort to cure IRCA's deficiencies. Parts III
and IV will compare these two methods, beginning with private
enforcement actions.
94 "[I]n 2002, the Social Security Administration sent out nearly I million
'no-match' letters to employers who submitted fake or mismatched Social
Security numbers on behalf of employees." Mark Krikorian, Punish Employers
Who Hire Illegals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2005, available at http://www.cis.
org/articles/2005/mskopedl20405.html.
95 Krikorian, supra note 94; see Oscar Avila, Immigration Bust Puts
Employers in Cross Hairs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2006, at 1 ("[EJmployers are in a
bind: ignoring the no-match letters might leave them more susceptible to federal
charges while aggressive responses might result in discrimination complaints.").
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IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: PERPETUATING THE STATUS QUO
Basic Pilot is not the only immigration tool that has been
passed to remedy the consequences of IRCA. Private enforcement
actions, like the one initiated against Swift & Co., are a growing
trend in the battle against illegal immigration. Touted as a
promising method for private entities to change immigration
enforcement," these lawsuits are a financial threat to employers."
However, private enforcement perpetuates many of the same
problems as IRCA.
A. Current and Emerging Private Causes ofAction
1. RICO
The failure of IRCA prompted lawmakers to search for new
measures that would better effectuate their goal of halting illegal
immigration. In a 1996 Congressional report, the Senate noted that
"[n]o matter how successful Congress might be in crafting a set of
immigration laws that would ... lead to the most long-term
benefits to the American people, such benefits will not actually
occur if those laws cannot be enforced."" Maintaining a
conviction that the prohibition on hiring illegal immigrants was the
key to successful immigration policy, Congress sought to provide
96 MICAH KING, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, RICO: A NEW TOOL FOR
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (Aug. 23, 2003), http://www.cis.org/
articles/2003/backl 103.pdf; see also Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 44, at 482-83;
Ehrenpreis, supra note 27, at 1206 ("[B]y increasing the civil sanctions and
strengthening the criminal penalties imposed on such employers to a point at
which the risk outweighs the reward of hiring unauthorized workers, employers
will stop hiring these workers. As a result, the biggest pull factor of illegal
immigration will be eliminated.").
97 Homicz, supra note 46, at 639.
98 S. REP. No. 104-249 (1996). The public agreed with Congress in a recent
survey taken by the Center for Immigration Studies:
Nearly three-out-of-four voters said that the United States had done too
little to enforce immigration laws. And three-quarters also agreed that
the reason we have so many illegals in this country is that past
enforcement efforts have [been] "grossly inadequate." Only [fourteen]
percent felt the government has made a "real effort" to enforce our
laws and the reason we have so much illegal immigration is that we are
not allowing in enough immigrants legally.
PUBLIC'S VIEW, supra note 37, at 1.
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for expanded enforcement to deter further violations.99 RICO
provided such a mechanism.
Passed in 1970, RICO constitutes an expansive attempt by
Congress to battle organized crime."' 0 Believing organized crime
was a "widespread" threat to the American economy, particularly
legitimate businesses, Congress sought to provide broad legal
mechanisms and more potent penalties to combat it."0 ' Thus, as
originally passed, prohibited "racketeering activities" included a
large spectrum of conduct ranging from financial schemes, like
embezzlement from pension funds,102 to more violent offenses such
as murder and kidnapping.10 3
It was not until 1996, with the passage of the Immigration
Control and Financial Responsibility Act" ("ICFRA"), that RICO
was amended to include violations of immigration law.0 ' Buried
deep within the voluminous provisions of ICFRA,
section 122(3)(ii) expanded the definition of "racketeering
activity" to include select violations of the INA.'16 Of particular
importance to businesses which hire illegal aliens was the
inclusion of section 274 which bans employers from "knowingly"
hiring at least ten illegal immigrants within a twelve month
period.' 7 This seemingly minor amendment remained unnoticed
by plaintiffs for several years following its enactment, but in
March of 2000 the first case employing this new enforcement tool
was brought in Connecticut.'
The most significant provision of RICO and certainly the
linchpin of Congress' new theory of immigration enforcement is
99 See S. REP. No. 104-249 (1996).
00 Homicz, supra note 46, at 625.
'0 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970).
102 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006).
'
0 3 Id. § 1961(1)(A).
1 Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, S. 1664,
108th Cong. (1996).
1os Id. § 122(3)(ii).
107 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2006).
108 See generally Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc.,
271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
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the private cause of action. The broad category of eligible
plaintiffs includes "[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason" of a prohibited immigration violation. 09 In addition to
demonstrating injury to their business or property, plaintiffs must
also show that the defendant engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering,"" 0 meaning that the defendant must have committed
at least two acts of racketeering within the last ten years."' Put
another way, to sustain a claim against an alleged infringer the
plaintiff must prove three things: (1) the employer knowingly
hired at least ten illegal aliens twice in the past ten years; (2) the
employer's purpose was to profit from the activity; and (3) the
plaintiff suffered injury to their business or property."12 However,
as will be discussed later, this task is harder than it may appear.
In addition to providing employers a method to defend against
unfair competition, RICO provides an extra incentive in the form
of substantial monetary recovery. To heavily penalize culprits of
organized crime, Congress provided that a successful plaintiff
could be awarded treble damages,"' plus the costs of the lawsuit
and reasonable attorney's fees." 4  Perhaps even more important
for plaintiffs wishing to drive unfair competitors out of business,
courts retained the express authority to divest culpable defendants
of any interest in a business."' In extreme cases, courts were
authorized to order the dissolution of the business."' The potent
damages provisions of RICO exact a high cost on employers who
are held liable for violations.
109 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). These provisions would allow both an
entity-like a corporation-or an individual employee to sue. Id
"o 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006).
.. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2006).
112 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(a) (2006); see
Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 380.
" Treble damages are defined as "[d]amages that, by statute, are three times
the amount that the fact-finder determines is owed." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 419 (8th ed. 2004).
114 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
"' Id. § 1964(a).
1"6 id.
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Commercial Cleaning Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc."7
was the first case brought under the expanded definition of RICO.
Commercial Cleaning Services ("Commercial"), a Connecticut
based company offering janitorial services in the Hartford area,
brought a RICO suit against its competitor, Colin Service Systems
("Colin")."' Commercial alleged that Colin's "illegal hiring
practices enabled it to lower its variable costs and thereby underbid
the plaintiff and other competing firms."ll9 The district court
granted Colin's motion to dismiss, stating that Commercial could
not show any damage to its business that had a "direct relation" to
the alleged racketeering activity.'20
In reversing the district court's finding, the Second Circuit held
that because Commercial could show it had directly competed for
contracts with Colin, the plaintiff had satisfied the "direct relation"
requirement of causation under RICO.12 ' Following this victory, a
series of similar cases were filed in other jurisdictions.'2 2
117 Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys. 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir.
2001).
"s Id. at 378.
119 Id
120 Id. at 379.
121 Id. at 380-82.
122 For example, see Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2002), in which employees of Zirkle claimed their employer hired illegal
aliens in an effort to purposefully depress their wages. As in Commercial
Cleaning, the trial court dismissed the complaint after finding that the plaintiffs'
harm could have been the result of multiple intervening factors and not Zirkle's
hiring of illegal immigrants. However, the Ninth Circuit declared a much lower
threshold for demonstrating causation, stating that the plaintiffs could sustain a
showing of causation based on the "market-power" theory. See also Williams v.
Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252, 1256-64 (11th Cir. 2005) (becoming the
latest jurisdiction to approve of the new RICO lawsuit when it found the
plaintiff employee's allegation that Mohawk lowered their wages by hiring
illegal aliens sufficient to state a cause of action); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods,
370 F.3d 602, 612 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing the trial court and holding that the
plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient causation based on the wage suppression
theory).
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2. State Unfair Competition Laws
The implementation of the private enforcement action has led
forward-looking plaintiffs' attorneys to search for additional tools
to hold unscrupulous employers accountable for their illegal hiring
practices. Broadly drafted state unfair competition laws have
become one such method. Most notable among these is
California's unfair competition law,123 which has become the first
to be utilized by plaintiffs in this experimental new form of private
enforcement.'24  As originally passed, "California's law was
considered to be especially liberal because anyone could sue for
alleged unfair practices without proving actual damages."' 25 Many
thought this expansive cause of action fostered frivolous claims by
businesses and large profits for law firms.'26 In 2004, California
voters reacted by passing Proposition 64, a referendum that
amended the unfair competition law to require plaintiffs to
demonstrate "actual loss."1l27 Thus, with the tightening of the law,
private lawsuits became much more difficult to plead.128
Despite the heightened pleading requirement, a lawsuit alleging
an employer hired illegal immigrants in violation of state unfair
competition law was filed in the summer of 2006.129 Global
Horizons, Inc., a California based labor-recruiting firm, sued
Munger Bros., a fruit producer, after Munger repudiated an
123 CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 17200 (2006).
124 Jim Kouri, California Illegal Alien Employers to Face Lawsuits for Unfair
Business Practices, AM. CHRON., June 28, 2006, http://www.americanchronicle.
com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articlelD=10970 (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
125 Dan Walters, Suits Would Open New Fronts in Immigration Legal Wars,
ARGUS (Freemont-Newark, Cal.), July 6, 2006.
126 id
127 Smartvoter.org, Proposition 64: Limit on Private Enforcement of Unfair
Business Competition Laws (Nov. 2, 2004), http://www.smartvoter.org/2004/11/
02/ca/state/prop/64/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
128 Walters, supra note 125.
129 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKUIs LLP, UNFAIR COMPETITION SUITS TARGET
ILLEGAL HIRING (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LIT_
IllegalHiringLF 07sept06.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).
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agreement to hire workers from Global.c 0 Global claimed that
Munger Bros. hired illegal aliens in place of the workers it was to
receive from Global."' Whether the utilization of this new form of
private enforcement will prove successful for Global remains to be
seen. However, should Global be successful, it will undoubtedly
be seen as a major triumph for advocates of private enforcement,
and similar suits will be sure to follow.132
B. Inhibitors of Reform
In light of the many problems surrounding these lawsuits, the
canonization of private enforcement as a major policy solution for
illegal immigration may be premature. As discussed below, high
pleading requirements and limited availability result in sporadic
utilization of these new tools. As a result, their usefulness as a
comprehensive enforcement policy is limited.
1. Legal Hurdles Facing Private Plaintiffs
The first question regarding private enforcement as an effective
immigration deterrent is its potential success rate in court. After
all, without a judgment or verdict in the plaintiffs favor, private
enforcement fails to counteract harm caused by the hiring of illegal
aliens. Difficult pleading requirements and limited availability
greatly diminish the utility of private enforcement."' Moreover,
courts continue to struggle with the task of crafting or calculating
an appropriate remedy.'3 4 In light of these concerns, the utility of
the private enforcement action on a national scale is called into
question.
13o California Action Targets Hiring of Illegal Immigrants Under California's
Unfair Competition Statute, http://classactiondefense.jmbm.com/2006/08/class_
action targets hiring_of.html (Aug. 23, 2006) [hereinafter California Statute]
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see also Elaine
S. Povich, Blowing the Whistle on Illegal Immigrants, CNNMONEY, Jan. 4,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/23/magazines/fsb/immigration.fsb/ (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'' California Statute, supra note 130.
132 id
133 Homicz, supra note 46, at 635-36.
134 Commercial Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 382
(2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the district court perceived the calculation of
damages to be difficult).
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When attempting to state a claim using RICO, plaintiffs have
the difficult burden of showing that the employer "knowingly"
hired illegal aliens.' Unlike immigration officials under IRCA,
private plaintiffs under RICO do not receive a presumption of
knowledge or a separate cause of action when an employer fails to
adequately verify documents and maintain records."' As a result,
while the defendant's failure to adequately review documentation
may provide support for the plaintiffs case, it does not give rise to
a presumption that the employer knowingly hired illegal aliens or a
cause of action for noncompliance.' Even such a small shift in
presumptions could determine whether a plaintiff is able to carry
her burden of proof. Moreover, the plaintiffs inability to charge
employers for failing to comply with the verification requirement
makes RICO ineffective at ensuring employers utilize the
compliance safeguard.
The more difficult showing for prospective RICO plaintiffs,
however, may be proving a "direct injury" to their business or
property.' IRCA did not require immigration officials to
demonstrate a specific injury in order to hold an employer liable.139
The employer need only have known they were hiring illegal aliens
regardless of the resulting injury. In contrast, under RICO,
plaintiffs must prove causation; namely that "but for" the hiring of
illegal aliens by their employer or competitor, they would have
suffered no loss.'4 0 Courts have struggled with this requirement
when determining whether plaintiffs have stated a sufficient claim,
and the result has been a split among the circuits.
In Baker v. JBP, Inc.,141 IBP, a meatpacking plant in Illinois,
was sued by several of its former employees for allegedly hiring
* 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2006).
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
1 See id.
138 Homicz, supra note 46, at 638-39; see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
126 S. Ct. 1991, 1998 (2006).
139 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-c (2006).
140 Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 380-81 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("The 'direct relation' requirement generally precludes recovery by a
'plaintiff who complains of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited
upon a third person by the defendant's acts."').
141 357 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2004).
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illegal aliens and suppressing wages for plant workers. Ruling for
IBP, the Seventh Circuit found that the market-theory of wage
suppression did not offer sufficient causation for the plaintiff to
show injury. 42 Further, the court held that IBP, as the sole
defendant, did not constitute an "enterprise" that could be held
liable for racketeering under RICO.'43
In 2006, it appeared that the Supreme Court would resolve the
circuit conflict when it granted certiorari in Williams v. Mohawk
Industries, Inc.'" However, the Court vacated the decision in a
short per curiam opinion and remanded the case to the Eleventh
Circuit without deciding the issue.145 The Eleventh Circuit then
modified its former decision, but still upheld the plaintiffs'
allegation of wage suppression under RICO.14 6  Therefore, a
disparity continues to exist between the circuits which have heard
RICO immigration enforcement actions, and the ability of
plaintiffs to bring an action depends on the jurisdiction in which
the suit is filed.
Private enforcement actions, based on state unfair competition
laws, face legal challenges similar to those posed by RICO-based
actions. As courts have not yet heard the pending lawsuits in
California, it is uncertain as to whether the plaintiffs will be
successful. However, given the history of the unfair competition
laws, plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail. Before the passage of
142 Id. at 692 ("Although the ninth circuit concluded in Mendoza that the
injury workers suffer when wages are depressed by competition from aliens is
similar to the kind of injuries redressed under the antitrust laws, things may not
be so straightforward. An increased supply of labor logically affects, not just
the wages at IBP's Joslin plant, but wages throughout the region (if not the
country). Workers can change employers (leaving IBP for higher pay
elsewhere), and this process should cause equilibration throughout the labor
market. Yet plaintiffs' theory is not that too many aliens depress wages around
Joslin; it is that IBP pays lower wages than some competitors, and that effect
would be very hard to attribute to particular violations of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(3)(A).").
143 id.
144 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005).
145 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006).
146 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1277, 1282-91 (11th Cir.
2006).
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Proposition 64, the law was invoked unsuccessfully by employees
seeking to hold their farmer-employer accountable for hiring
illegal immigrants.14 7 Now that the law has been subsequently
narrowed, the "actual loss" requirement further undermines the
likelihood of success. Moreover, recourse is available only to
employers or employees who happen to reside in California. 48
Thus, the potential for relief is limited to only those jurisdictions
that have similarly liberal laws.
The stringent pleading requirements and lack of national
congruity pose serious legal hurdles to private enforcement and
thereby undermine its utility as a solution for illegal immigration.
As will be shown below, in addition to posing problems for
plaintiffs who wish to pursue private enforcement, these legal
limitations further stress the current tension between employers
and illegal immigrants.
2. More of the Same
The previous discussion of IRCA identified several key issues
for employers that undermined its effectiveness as an immigration
solution.149  Rather than correcting these problems, however,
private enforcement actions have further complicated them on
several levels.
First, private enforcement actions foster a new form of
employer deputization. Under IRCA, employers are expected to
help guard the nation's borders by denying jobs to illegal aliens
thereby deterring them from entering the country.' Under the
new forms of private enforcement, employers are expected to play
a proactive role in holding competitors accountable for their hiring
practices. This expectation ignores several factors that may
decrease many potential plaintiffs' desire or ability to bring a
lawsuit. For example, in the context of the agricultural industry,
the market may not support higher wages for employees, which
means farmers are more likely to depend on illegal labor and less
147 Walters, supra note 125.
I48 id.
149 See supra Part III(B).
1so See Espenoza, supra note 75, at 344.
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likely to utilize private enforcement."' Moreover, if the defendant
does not have deep pockets that would make it worthwhile for a
plaintiffs attorney to risk a contingency fee arrangement, the
plaintiff will be expected to bear the potentially high costs of
litigating the claim.152
Additionally, under IRCA, employers continue to face liability
for their failure to sufficiently determine whether a "reasonable
man" would approve of the documentation offered by their
employees."' In light of the availability of private enforcement
actions, the decision rests in the hands of American juries, which
have the potential to be comprised of individuals that disfavor
illegal immigration and believe that increased enforcement would
solve the problem. 15 4
Second, the combination of the treble damages provision of
RICO and employer deputization provides new incentive for
discrimination. Employers are forced to continuously attempt to
balance their need to vigorously identify and reject illegal aliens
with the possibility of doing too much and risking a discrimination
151 Elisabeth Sweeney Yu, Addressing the Economic Impact of Undocumented
Immigration on the American Worker: Private RICO Litigation and Public
Policy, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 909, 912 (2006); see also
Eduardo Porter, Immigrants Wanted: Legal Would Be Nice, but Illegal Will
Suffice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at CI(L) (quoting a North Carolina farmer
who said she would be forced to hire illegal immigrants if she lost her legal
immigrant workers).
152 See Kouri, supra note 124 (stating that "defendants in [RICO] suits may be
large corporations"); see also Edward Iwata, Companies Face RICO Lawsuits
on Illegals, USA TODAY, April 25, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/
money/companies/management/2006-04-25-immigration-suits-usatx.htm
(quoting Johnson & Bell attorney Howard Foster who says: "'The key issue is,
can a corporation be sued for engaging in illegal conduct with its recruiters? If
we win the case, there probably will be quite a few more cases filed against
corporations."') (emphasis added) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
153 See Pearce, supra note 58, at 604.
154 See PUBLIC'S VIEW, supra note 37 ("Nearly three-out-of-four voters said
that the United States had done too little to enforce immigration laws. And
three-quarters also agreed that the reason we have so many illegals in this
country is that past enforcement efforts have [been] 'grossly inadequate."').
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suit.'" As a consequence, employers may find it more prudent to
err on the side of caution by risking the less-costly discrimination
suit instead of a judgment for treble damages under RICO.156
Third, private lawsuits inherently involve selective
enforcement of immigration laws. The lack of across-the-board
enforcement under IRCA allowed employers to engage in illegal
hiring practices.'17 Law-abiding employers were forced to compete
with these unscrupulous competitors. Private enforcement actions
share the same basic flaw. Only a handful of suits have been
brought in the ten-year history of private enforcement due to the
pleading requirements and unavailability of the action in some
jurisdictions."' As a result, many employers are required to
compete on an unfair playing field with competitors that continue
to utilize illegal labor.
The selective enforcement resulting from this legal limitation
disadvantages employers because it provides only a regional
solution to a national problem. In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., the
Ninth Circuit accepted the plaintiffs' "market-power" theory of
causation.'59 The court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that the
defendants comprised "a large percentage of the fruit orchards and
packing houses in the area, and therefore affect wages throughout
the labor market" was a sufficient showing of causation.160 If one
accepts the "market-power" theory, then it follows that employers
in a private enforcement jurisdiction will be at a competitive
disadvantage with employers that are able to continue to utilize
illegal labor because of their location in a jurisdiction which does
not permit private enforcement.
"s See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-c (2006); Prescott, supra note 86, at 5.
156 The defense costs for an accused employer have "the potential to cost
employers even more than nationwide civil rights and overtime class actions."
Mary Pivec, Immigration Woes in the Workplace, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id= 1139565914312 (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
1s7 See Tangor, supra note 34, at 63.
158 See Green & Ciobanu, supra note 78, at 1220-23.
159 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
it "sufficient that the [plaintiffs] ... alleged market power-they must not be put
to the test to prove this allegation at the pleading stage").
160 id
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Moreover, even if the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split
by allowing private enforcement across-the-board, selective
enforcement would still cause an immediate increase in labor costs
for targeted companies. These companies would have to compete
in a market where some competitors have the advantage of
gradually phasing out illegal labor and increasing their costs of
production over time."' Thus, while proponents argue that the
long-term effect of private enforcement will positively impact
immigration policy,16 2 the short-term result for a targeted employer
means increased costs, decreased profits, and an unfair playing
field with competitors.
The problems with private enforcement may support the
conclusion that it does little to curb illegal immigration. However,
that is not necessarily the case. Private enforcement could prove to
be very effective if used to supplement a more comprehensive
strategy for immigration enforcement-namely, Basic Pilot.
V. ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION: A "BASIC" STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION
The difficulties inherent in both IRCA and private enforcement
leave employers without a bright line standard that ensures
protection from costly lawsuits and guarantees a level playing field
with their competitors. The Basic Pilot Program provides this line.
A brief discussion of the history and mechanics of electronic
verification is useful for evaluating the advantages of this system
over private enforcement and IRCA.
A. History and Mechanics
Congress first explored the concept of a computer-based
electronic system to help employers verify employee
documentation in 1996 with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IRIRA").' 6
161 See Jarosz, supra note 42, at 54 (quoting General Counsel for Swift & Co.
Don Wiseman) ("Slamming the [brakes] on is great. But if you slam them on
too hard, it has a serious disruptive effect.").
162 See, e.g., Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 44, at 476-82.
163 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-108, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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Section 401 of the Act required the Attorney General to establish a
voluntary pilot program for verifying work eligibility
documentation." Lauded by the Commission on Immigration
Reform as "the most promising option for verifying work
authorization," a program called Basic Pilot was introduced in
which employers could volunteer to use a database established by
immigration officials to verify employee documentation using their
social security numbers.'65 As originally passed, the program had
only a four-year life-span and limited availability.'66 However, due
to the growing interest in the program, Congress extended the
program in 2001.6' In 2003, the program became available
nationwide.'6 8 Currently, Basic Pilot is the most widely utilized
form of electronic verification, with more than 10,000 employers
signed up to use the system.169
The Basic Pilot Program is an Internet-based system which
verifies prospective employee documentation using government
databases. If an employer wishes to enroll in the program, she
must first register with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS) and the SSA."e Once the employer is registered,
the process begins with the employer reviewing the prospective
employee's documentation prior to hiring, and attesting to the
documents on the appropriate forms as required by IRCA."'
Important for purposes of Basic Pilot, citizen employees must
provide their employers with a valid social security number, and
16 id.
165 VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
166 Id
167 Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, 115 Stat. 2407
(2001).
168 Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117 Stat. 1944
(2003).
169 JoHN M. KEELEY, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE IMPACT OF
EMPLOYER VERIFICATION (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/
jmktestimony09l2O6.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
170 Smart Business Practices, How to Start Using the Basic Pilot Progam,
http://www.smartbusinesspractices.com/legal_howtousebasicpilot.php (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
171 Your Business, supra note 12.
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non-citizens must have authorization from the DHS to work in the
United States.17 2 Non-citizen employees authorized to work are
also given a social security number to provide to their employer.'7 3
The employer transmits the applicant's social security number
to DHS via the Internet, where the information is electronically
processed and transmitted to the SSA.'74 The SSA compares the
information with its primary database, the Numerical Identification
File, which contains citizenship status information of all Social
Security Card holders."' If the social security number provided by
the employer matches SSA records, the employer receives a
confirmation notice and the process is complete."' However, if the
information provided by the employer does not match SSA
records, the employer receives a tentative non-confirmation notice,
and must refer the employee to SSA to resolve the problem."'
If an employee's information matches SSA records but the
employee does not have work authorization status, the information
is compared to the USCIS's Customer Processing System."' If the
employee's information still cannot be confirmed, the information
is then transferred to Immigration Status Verifiers, who manually
check DHS records to verify the information."' If the information
remains unconfirmed, the employer receives a message telling her
to send the employee to SSA to work out the problem.'s Finally,
if the employee fails to contest the tentative non-confirmation
172 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.
COORDINATED APPROACH TO SSN DATA COULD HELP REDUCE UNAUTHORIZED
WORK 1 (Feb. 16, 2006) [hereinafter COORDINATED APPROACH].
1 Id. In addition to citizens, social security numbers may only be assigned to
non-citizen permanent residents or non-citizen residents authorized to work in
the United States. 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(2) (2003).
174 Your Business, supra note 12.
" AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIC
PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2004) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7C6715%7C16871 %7C185
23%7C1 1260.
176 Id.
17 Id.
178 id.
as Id.
179 du
1so Your Business, supra note 12.
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notice within ten days, whether for a failed SSA match or work
authorization status, the employer receives a final
non-confirmation notice and has the option to either terminate the
employee or notify DHS that the employee is being retained.'"' If
the employer retains the employee, she may be liable for
immigration violations.18 2
Employers' responses to the program have been positive. DHS
reported that 96% of participating employers believed the system
provided an effective screening tool.m1 3 Moreover, 93% thought the
process was easier than current IRCA requirements.1 84 Basic
Pilot's growth in popularity is evident from its increasing
participation rates. In 2005, Dunkin Donuts required "all 5,000 of
its franchisees" to begin using the system."' And, as mentioned
previously, the State of North Carolina recently required all state
employers to use the system. 6
Given the response by politicians to its increasing popularity
with businesses, the future of Basic Pilot seems bright. In a recent
comment on immigration reform, President Bush stated: "Part of a
comprehensive immigration plan is to give employers the tools
necessary to determine whether or not the workers they're looking
for are here legally in America. And we've got such a plan-Basic
Pilot, it's called. It's working.""8 Moreover, in 2005 the House of
Representatives passed the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act, which would change existing law
by mandating that employers use an electronic verification system
181 id
182 VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
183 id
184 ld
185 Immigrant Employment Verification and Small Business, Before the H
Subcommittee on Workforce, Empowerment and Government Programs of the
H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Mark Krikorian,
Ctr. for Immigration Studies).
186 Heffeman, supra note 24.
187 President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Basic Pilot: A Clear and Reliable
Way to Verify Employment Eligibility (July 5, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060705-6.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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which builds upon Basic Pilot.' In the same year, the Senate also
passed a bill requiring employers to use an electronic verification
system albeit under terms slightly different from the House bill.189
This positive acceptance by employers and politicians suggests
that Basic Pilot is on its way to becoming a staple of American
immigration policy. However, in light of the problems facing
employers, the real question is whether Basic Pilot provides a more
comprehensive method than private enforcement for deterring
illegal immigration and addressing employer dependency on
undocumented labor.
B. Basic Pilot Provides a Better Solution
As discussed, IRCA and private enforcement actions have
many disadvantages for employers. Basic Pilot, however,
produces the opposite result. By drawing a bright line for
employers, the system reduces de facto "deputization" and
increases the ability of immigration officials to prosecute
unscrupulous employers across-the-board. These advantages over
private enforcement highlight Basic Pilot's ability to provide a
better solution for illegal immigration.
1. Basic Pilot Reduces Employer Deputization
The most notable advantage of Basic Pilot is its effectiveness
in reducing employer responsibility for document verification.
Both IRCA and private lawsuits under RICO require employers to
determine whether their compliance efforts would be satisfactory
to the "reasonable man."'9 0 In contrast, Basic Pilot decreases
employer responsibility for the document review process. Unlike
IRCA, the burden of deciding whether an employee's
documentation is authentic ultimately rests with immigration
officials, who are better equipped to make the determination.19 '
118 H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). The Act would amend the provisions of
IRCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b), to include electronic employment verification as a
method of compliance.
189 S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2005).
190 Pearce, supra note 58, at 604.
191 See Your Business, supra note 12. Natalie Prescott recently observed that,
in order to reduce employer discrimination, additionally "Congress should shift
384 [VOL. 8: 349
SPRING 2007] Immigrants & Electronic Verification
Employers are provided a confirmation or non-confirmation from
immigration officials, and are not forced to rely on their own
subjective decision of whether the employee's documents look
reasonably genuine. 9 2 As one North Carolina employer noted,
Basic Pilot "removes the guesswork when identifying legitimate
documents .... "193
Basic Pilot further reduces employer deputization by requiring
employees, not employers, to follow-up on a non-confirmation
notice.194 Employers no longer need to worry about whether to
request additional documentation from the employee and face a
potential discrimination suit. Under Basic Pilot, employees are
ultimately responsible for demonstrating the validity of their
information to employers, and employers are spared the time,
expense, and liability of ensuring the validity of each and every
employee.
Basic Pilot also gives employers the option to use what are
called "Designated Agents" to conduct their Basic Pilot
compliance.195 Designated Agents are companies that perform
Basic Pilot compliance for other businesses.'96 In 2005, DHS
approved the first such agent, Form 1-9 Compliance, LLC, based in
Newport Beach, California.' The company states that its service
will "[c]ost-effectively reduce [employers'] exposure to
government audits, financial penalties and negative publicity
resulting from non-compliance."'9 8 While this new method to
reduce employer deputization is still in its infancy, it offers another
some of the verification burden to governmental agencies." Prescott, supra note
86, at 35.
192 VAUGHAN, supra note 13. Employers who choose to hire the employee
after receiving a non-confirmation response may face an enforcement action,
and their chances of proving that they did not "knowingly" hire the illegal alien
are greatly reduced. See id.
193 Gonzalez, supra note 21.
194 Your Business, supra note 12.
1' VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
196 KEELEY, supra note 169.
197 Id.; Form 1-9 Compliance, http://www.formi9.com [hereinafter Form 1-9
Compliance] (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
198 Form 1-9 Compliance, supra note 197.
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tool to enable employers to reduce their potential culpability and
protect themselves from costly immigration sanctions.
Reduced deputization also has the benefit of decreasing
employers' incentive to engage in potentially discriminating
behavior.' 99 IRCA placed employers in the undesirable position of
weighing the risks between potential immigration sanctions and
discrimination suits.20 0 Private enforcement actions arguably
tipped the scales in favor of the latter.20' The bright line provided
by Basic Pilot removes employers' discretion in deciding whether
documents offered by employees are valid. In fact, employers are
not allowed to "prescreen" prospective employees using the system
prior to actually hiring the employee.20 2 As such, employees with
questionable work-authorization should receive the benefit of the
doubt in the hiring decision, and employers no longer have the
same incentive to deny them employment.20 3 Thus, the definitive
confirmation or non-confirmation notice has benefits for both
employees and employers.
199 See Prescott, supra note 86, at 35.
2 Id. at 1-2.
201 See supra Part IV(B).
202 Melvin Hass III, William Clifton III & Jonathan Martin II, Article: Labor
& Employment Law, 58 MERCER L. REv. 211, 219 (2005). Opponents of Basic
Pilot have argued that employers abuse this prohibition and discriminate against
an employee who receives a non-confirmation notice before hiring by denying
them employment. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., THE BASIC PILOT PROGRAM
NOT A MAGIC BULLET 3 (2007), http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/
ircaempverif/basicpilot nomagicbullet_2007-01-1l.pdf (last visited May 4,
2007) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
However, IRCA's remedies for discrimination are available to applicants even
when the employer uses Basic Pilot. Moreover, if employers prescreen an
applicant and fail to hire them on that basis, the applicant might have a stronger
case for discrimination since employers are forbidden to do so. Thus, Basic
Pilot could potentially aid a plaintiff s discrimination claim.
203 It is important to note that employers are not allowed to hire an employee
whose documentation clearly appears less than reasonably genuine-the
requirements of IRCA remain in effect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). However,
if the determination of the document's validity is a close call for employers,
Basic Pilot provides an incentive to hire the employee and await the return of a
confirmation or non-confirmation determination by immigration officials.
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2. Basic Pilot Reduces Selective Enforcement
Basic Pilot's second advantage over private enforcement and
IRCA lies in its ability to decrease selective enforcement. IRCA
provided no oversight tool for immigration authorities, which
hampered their enforcement efforts.2" Officials were forced to
review documentation information on an ad hoc basis because
employers were not required to submit compliance documents
without a specific request from immigration authorities.205 As a
result, the cumbersome process allowed most employers to
continue their hiring practices without fear of being targeted.20 6
Basic Pilot, however, helps resolve this tension. The program
provides immigration officials with direct information about an
employee's status by allowing them to monitor confirmation and
non-confirmation notices.2 07 ICE may contact and, if necessary,
bring charges against employers who ignore non-confirmation
notices.20 8 Thus, Basic Pilot supplies a previously non-existent
oversight tool to immigration authorities, enabling officials to
better identify unscrupulous employers and focus their limited
resources. Furthermore, by increasing the efficiency of the
204 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-c.
205 Illegal Immigration: Enforcing Employee Verification Laws and
Implementing a Stronger Verification System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of John Chakwin, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/
news/testimonies/06073 1 testimony.pdf; see FORM 1-9, supra note 80.
206 See Espenoza, supra note 75, at 377-81.
207 See VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
208 See Hearing, supra note 205.
The Administration has sought the authority to have additional access
to Social Security Administration no-match data to improve
immigration enforcement. Greater access to no-match data would
provide important direction to ICE investigators to target their
enforcement actions toward those employers who have a
disproportionate number of these no-matches, who have reported
earnings for multiple employees on the same number and who are
therefore more likely to be engaging in unlawful behavior.
Id.
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agencies, officials can more accurately identify targets for worksite
raids.209
Basic Pilot also helps to expose culpable employers. As shown
above, private lawsuits require a showing that employers
"knowingly" hired illegal aliens-a heavy burden for any
plaintiff.210 Basic Pilot provides a method to make employers
easier to prosecute under the "knowing" standard.2 1' The
program's bright line provides enforcement authorities a clearer
view of employers who overstep the boundaries of the law. It has
been suggested that because employers may simply choose not to
run a questionable employee through the system, the self-
compliance aspect of Basic Pilot undermines the effectiveness of
the program.212 However, if employers engage in such a practice,
Basic Pilot could actually help create an inference that the
employer "knowingly" hired illegal aliens. For example, if an
employer is investigated by ICE and found to have employed
illegal aliens, failure to utilize Basic Pilot may work to show
increased culpability. As one commentator suggested, the loss of
"deniability . . . [is] probably why so few companies have signed
up."213
Basic Pilot also decreases compliance and litigation costs for
employers. Private enforcement actions place heavy costs on both
plaintiffs and accused employers. Moreover, following a
government raid an employer may face an immediate increase in
209 EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 83, at 5-6 ("Basic Pilot could
help the [DHS] better target its worksite enforcement efforts at those employers
who do not follow program requirements.").
210 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2006).
211 Porter, supra note 28.
212 Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 964 (2006).
Because of the current verification system's reliance on employer self-
compliance, employers could simply choose not to use the databases,
ignore the databases' negative responses, or tacitly or explicitly ask
prospective employees to come up with other identity information to
process into the system when there are doubts about the authenticity of
identification materials.
Id.
213 Porter, supra note 28.
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the cost of labor. Unlike IRCA and private enforcement, Basic
Pilot provides a method of gradually weaning employers from their
dependence on illegal labor. Congressional efforts to codify
electronic verification have all been stipulated on the inclusion of a
gradual phase-in of the system.2 14 Current proposals would not
require employers to implement the system any earlier than a year
and a half after passage of a bill.215 Consequently, employers could
dilute the expense of transition over a period of months, or even
years, rather than a day as in the case of Swift.216
Significantly, participation in Basic Pilot is currently
voluntary.2 17 Without mandatory participation by all employers,
the ability of the system to have a potent effect on selective
enforcement is limited. However, since both the House and Senate
have passed legislation that would require across-the-board
employer participation, Congress appears to have concluded that
mandatory participation in Basic Pilot is the cornerstone of any
new immigration reform.218 Until the system is utilized on a
national scale, however, the benefits of reducing selective
enforcement remain limited. Even on a voluntary basis, however,
Basic Pilot still has an advantage over private enforcement and
IRCA. As more and more employers enroll in the program and
grant immigration authorities increased oversight of their hiring
practices, those who resist participation in the program are
increasingly likely to become targets for future government
enforcement efforts.
214 Jarosz, supra note 42, at 51.
215 id
216 As a result of the one-day raid, Swift & Co. is expected to suffer a loss of
$100 million. Swift Raid Impacts Families, Economy, ID Theft Victims,
THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/
news/10523648/detail.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
217 Your Business, supra note 12.
218 KEELEY, supra note 169.
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3. Pilot Provides Partial Solution to Counterfeit Documentation
Finally, Basic Pilot provides a method to decrease the utility of
counterfeit documentation. Fraudulent documentation produces a
plethora of problems for employers and frustrates the effectiveness
of IRCA and private lawsuits. Basic Pilot addresses this problem
by using electronic databases that match employee information
with government records. A recent GAO study found that Basic
Pilot "assists participating employers with identification of false
documents used to obtain employment by comparing employees'
... information with information in [government] databases."2 19
However, in a later report the GAO found "the program cannot
expose identity theft."220 Consequently, although Basic Pilot is
largely successful in preventing document fraud, the most
prevalent form of counterfeiting, it has been ineffective in regards
to identity theft.
Despite Basic Pilot's limitation, the GAO found that the
program has potential advantages in the fight against identity theft:
"[C]onfirmations of numerous queries of the same social security
number could indicate the social security number is being used
fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers by accepting the same social security
numbers for multiple employees."22 1 Moreover, Basic Pilot's
ability to block document fraud requires that counterfeiters move
to identity fraud, which is more expensive and less available.22 2
Thus, Basic Pilot could have at least an ancillary benefit in
preventing identity theft. There are, however, federal laws
currently preventing federal authorities from taking full advantage
of this benefit. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS, stated his
dissatisfaction with the current law in a statement following the
Swift raid:
219 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 84, at 9-10.
220 EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 83, at 5.
221 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 84, at 10.
222 Malns, supra note 212, at 965; VAUGHAN, supra note 13.
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[A] question that arises is why is it that people are able to get away
with using genuine identities ... to get work? In other words, why
doesn't Basic Pilot cover this, too? And the answer is, there's a legal
obstacle. The law currently does not allow the Social Security
Administration to refer to [DHS] instances where the same Social
security number is used on multiple occasions in multiple work places
as a basis for obtaining jobs.223
Supporting this view, the GAO found that increased sharing of
information between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), DHS,
and SSA could lead to a reduced number of unauthorized
workers.224 Whether Congress will act on these suggestions is still
an open question. At present, Basic Pilot has only a limited
application in exposing identity theft.
Basic Pilot provides many advantages to employers over IRCA
and private enforcement. Reduced employer deputization and
selective enforcement by immigration officials provides a
significant layer of protection for employers, and a more realistic
chance at a level economic playing field. However, Basic Pilot's
effectiveness is limited by the lack of full coordination among
federal agencies and mandatory employer participation. Despite
these limitations, Basic Pilot offers many advantages for
employers who wish to reduce their potential liability for
immigration violations.
223 Chertoff, supra note 19.
224 COORDINATED APPROACH, supra note 172, at 10-12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Illegal immigration has had a significant impact on the
American labor market. Employer dependency on illegal labor,
inconsistent enforcement by immigration authorities, depressed
wages, and the risk for displacement of American employees pose
complicated and often conflicting problems for political authorities
wishing to remedy the current situation. IRCA, an initial attempt
to halt the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States, has
placed employers in a dubious position. Employers are expected
to identify fraudulent documentation with virtually no oversight by
immigration authorities. Furthermore, the employer must
determine how a "reasonable man" would evaluate the
documentation without over-reaching and subjecting themselves to
possible discrimination claims.
This de facto "deputization" required that employers ignore the
draw of cheap illegal labor and instead become expert document
examiners. Neither obstacle was accounted for by IRCA. As a
result, rather than curtailing the use of illegal labor, IRCA actually
enabled it. With little threat of sanctions, employers continued to
take advantage of illegal labor to reduce costs and increase profits.
A continual supply of illegal immigrants, coupled with a
competitive market, made employers dependent on inexpensive
labor. Thus, immigration enforcement efforts fell victim to
political pressure from targeted businesses.
The failure of IRCA prompted lawmakers to search for new
approaches to the illegal labor problem. In 1996, two such
methods were adopted-private enforcement actions and the Basic
Pilot Program. Private enforcement actions are valuable because
they can provide immediate relief to an employer unable to
compete with unscrupulous competitors. However, private
enforcement ultimately perpetuates employer dependency on
illegal labor and selective enforcement of immigration laws
because of its ad hoc approach to enforcement. Furthermore,
private enforcement actions are unavailable in many jurisdictions.
Even where private enforcement actions are available, difficult
pleading requirements are a significant barrier for potential
plaintiffs.
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For employers, the threat of treble damages provides additional
incentive to discriminate against employees with questionable
documentation. Private enforcement also fails to give employers
the ability to gradually wean themselves off of illegal labor,
resulting in an immediate increase in costs that may undermine the
business's long term viability. As such, private enforcement
offers, at best, a partial solution to the conflicting problems caused
by illegal immigration.
If private enforcement is part of the solution, the Basic Pilot
Program arguably provides the rest, and is a promising tool for
addressing the dilemma created by illegal labor. Basic Pilot
provides a bright line upon which employers can rely. A
confirmation or non-confirmation notice from Basic Pilot provides
employers with a decisive answer to the validity of an employee's
documentation, thereby reducing an employer's incentive to
discriminate against an employee who presents questionable
documentation. Moreover, Basic Pilot provides immigration
officials with an oversight tool that enables them to hone their
enforcement efforts and conserve valuable resources.
Basic Pilot, however, has limitations as well. While the system
can detect false documentation, in its current incarnation, Basic
Pilot is ill-equipped to address identity theft issues. Additionally,
without a mandatory participation requirement for all employers,
Basic Pilot cannot produce a guaranteed industry-wide level
playing field for employers. Whether Congress will address these
shortcomings is still an open question, but given the recent bills
passed in the House and Senate, the possibility of a mandatory
program looks promising.
Basic Pilot provides employers with peace of mind in their
hiring decisions. Moreover, it provides a cautionary tool that
lowers the likelihood of costly lawsuits and potentially expensive
employee turnover. One commentator has gone so far as to
suggest that employers who fail to sign up for the program are
breaching their fiduciary duty to their shareholders.2 25 Thus, for
225 KEELEY, supra note 169.
I would submit that public companies that are not participating in the
Basic Pilot are neglecting their fiduciary responsibility to their
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employers like the State of North Carolina, Basic Pilot is a
valuable tool which helps guard against not only illegal immigrants
infiltrating the workforce, but also the possibility of being held
liable for immigration violations.2 26
shareholders through imprudent labor practices that will jeopardize the
stability of their labor force. Privately held businesses, while not
answerable to stockholders, nonetheless have a moral responsibility to
their employees and customers and creditors to conduct due diligence
in hiring.
Id.
226 For example, Swift & Co. was not charged by immigration officials for any
immigration violations despite the voluminous hiring of illegal immigrants.
Anabelle Garay, Former Employees Sue Swift & Co., Say Meatpacker Hired
Illegal Workers to Keep Wages Low, AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Dec. 19,
2006, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2006/12/19/business/news/12 49 0812
18_06.txt (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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